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
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CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

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NOBODY FOR HUGHES

—BUT THE PEOPLE

BY THE EDITOR

As for us, our eyes as yet failed for our vain help: in our watching we have watched for a nation that could not save us.—Lamentations, iv: 17.

WHEN not so long ago the Honorable Henry A. Cooper of Racine, Wisconsin, remarked somewhat grimly in the House of Representatives that it would be vastly easier to "stand by the President" if the President himself would stand still, we have to confess that no slight effort was required to suppress a sigh of sympathetic understanding. But now when we pause to contemplate the political happenings of the past two months and compare even the most notable contradictoriness of our President who is, with the astonishing performances of our President who was, we feel as one abruptly transported from the rock of Gibraltar into the heart of a prairie cyclone.

Here only last March we were speculating calmly and quietly upon the prospective marriage of a party having principles but no leader to a party having a leader but no principles. Our Colonel, of course, was the suitor, not humble perhaps but most considerate, most tender, most ingratiating and wholly unselfish,—in truth, to all seeming, a veritable John Alden, speaking not for himself at all but for anybody here named Kelly or Miles (not the General) or Standish or what-not. And then like a bolt from the blue

came from Trinidad the flashing intimation that Our Hero might be induced to speak for himself if only Priscilla, too, would be heroic.

But the lady shied. No longer a credulous Puritan maid, but fully matured in years and experience, widowed in fact by the hand of an assassin who for the nonce shall be nameless, she did not even hesitate. Thus far (and welcome) but no farther,—this was the firm response. Whereupon our gentle suitor reverted to type, transformed himself into a Cave Man and inaugurated a Campaign of Frightfulness, compared with which Germany's is mildly persuasive. Lord love us! What a world! What a time! What a man!

Two months ago when we were speculating—not predicting, mind you—there was much talk of favorite sons and sons-in-law,—talk, as may be recalled, which struck us as quite fatuous at a time when, more surely perhaps than ever before, a boy ought not to be selected to do a man's work. Hence our suggestion as the most promising combinations, as of the moment, of Root for President and Roosevelt for Senator and of Roosevelt for President and Root for Secretary of State. Although few concurred in this judgment at the time, the consensus of opinion at this writing seems to accord with the view then expressed. Oddly enough, while other minds have been groping to that early tentative conclusion, our own has changed completely as the consequence of an unforeseen development, which presently in due order shall be revealed. In a word, while daring in March only to speculate, we now in May stand ready to predict.

But first let us glimpse the rapidly moving picture. Assuming, as we may assume now with confidence, that the favorite sons previously regarded have flickered out on the film that has disappeared, what do we perceive? Technically the stage is about as dark as a stage can be. That is to say, officially there are no candidates except Mr. du Pont, who stands for Powder, and Mr. Ford, who personifies Peace. Truly, the nomination of both of these opulent citizens, if that were feasible, would make for a clearly defined issue; but probably we are warranted in leaving the favorite of Michigan in the seclusion of his advertising department and the proprietor of Delaware to the tender mercies of the ubiquitary Mr. Ormsby McHarg. There remain then in the luminous limelight, as manipulated with scrupulous impartiality by Mr. Robert Bacon, but two striking figures, the

one distinguished, the other heroic,—Root and Roosevelt. Nobody else is in sight; and yet—but wait!

“Elihu Root,” wrote President Nicholas Murray Butler in beginning the proclamation signed by seventy New York Republicans, “is the ablest living American.” This is going far—so far, indeed, as to invite consideration of the relative capacities of many others who have achieved eminence in their respective spheres. But there is no call to make comparisons which might seem to be invidious. What Dr. Butler meant to say was that Mr. Root is the greatest living American statesman,—a simple fact universally recognized. So there need be no analysis or discussion of his qualifications, none of his achievements or experience, none of his fidelity to the interests of the Nation since it became his client sixteen years ago. Mr. Root clearly and beyond question, in the words of the proclamation, “stands pre-eminent among contemporary Americans as a constructive, far-sighted and forward-facing statesman.” As a partisan, moreover, not only has he earned the highest reward, but he cannot again be in a position to receive it. He should be nominated. We wish he might be. But we are concerned now, not with preferences nor with proprieties, but with prospects. The real questions are: Do the people want Mr. Root? and Does the Republican party think it could elect him in opposition to Mr. Wilson? Answer the first question and the second may be disregarded.

Whoever says Our Colonel is a candidate is a liar. He is no hill-climber. He is Mahomet. If the Mountain sees fit to come to him, it may bask in the glories of Heaven; if not, it can go to Hell. “I will not enter into any fight for the nomination and I will not permit any factional fight to be made in my behalf. Indeed, I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic; unless it feels not only like devoting itself to ideals, but to the purpose measurably to realize those ideals in action.” This was the Message from Trinidad,—since emphasized and amplified, but in no sense repudiated or shaded. Did not Our Colonel attend the hallowed primary of his party, an enthusiastic gathering of six or maybe seven, and declare positively that he was still a Progressive and that, whatever else one might find to his disfavor, nobody yet had questioned his Americanism? He did, indeed, and with a warranted assurance, too, that

not everybody in public life—we have nobody in particular in mind—could justify by a mere inquiry.

Then three days later came the wonderful interview, the *most* wonderful interview we have ever read. It was wholly impromptu, of course—i. e., constructed on Monday, revised on Tuesday and delivered on Wednesday—and it was realistic to a degree,—so realistic in point of fact that we no longer wonder at Mr. Howells's advocacy of Mr. Roosevelt's vociferously unsought re-election. A caller called. That was the beginning. Then—from this point all accounts in the universal Press, associated, dissociated, united, dis-united, special, common, are precisely alike—then, the account continues:

This visitor was from a nearby State.

Connecticut maybe, or New Jersey or Penrose's Pennsylvania or little old Rhode Island or perhaps a State of Mind, all nearby; but no, this was hardly possible, since all approaches were closely guarded by lynx-eyed reporters; wherefore the Mysterious Stranger must have arrived by aeroplane or submarine. In any case, he was no ghostly offspring of the imagination of William Bayard (or was it Edward Everett) Hale; he was a man *with* a country, which he was willing to serve. In fact, continuing the tale:

—who came to Sagamore Hill saying that he expected to be a candidate for Congress as well as a delegate to the G. O. P. convention. Then, in hopes of securing the Colonel's support for Congress [not for Delegate, mind you, but for a *Republican* nomination for Congress; odd thing that!] the optimistic pilgrim [so depicted by all public journals] added: "You know, Colonel, I may make up my mind that we'll have to nominate you."

Extraordinary! Consider, please. Of course, a passing caller from a nearby State might be designated as a "pilgrim," if he dropped out of the clouds or ascended from the waters; in point of fact, he was; so more need not be said. But how in the name of Munsey could even such an one be "optimistic," in contemplation of a dread possibility? Imagine a person throwing up his hands in glee at the prospect of having a tooth pulled! Here is subtlety, brethren, subtlety unsurpassed to our mind in recent years except perhaps in substituting for the official record "incomparably the most adequate"—whatever that may be—for "incomparably the greatest" navy in the world. But that, like

the bewildering secret order to Funston and his soldiers to play the part of rabbit dogs for a while and then come home, regardless of the destiny of the fox, constitutes the basis of another story. We revert hurriedly to Secretary Æsop's Fable of the Startled Warrior and the Cheerful Mourner.

"Well," began the Colonel, pausing a moment to gather his strength before letting loose, "now let me give you a piece of advice. If you have any doubts on the subject don't nominate me."

Very good, Eddy, very good! Inasmuch as "the subject" which had brought the Optimist all the way from Nowhere in the United States was his own candidacy for Congress, it was quite logical for Our Colonel to reply sternly "If you have any doubts, don't nominate *me*," but some little effort was required necessarily, and it was only natural that he should pause a moment to gather his strength before letting loose. Whether the Pilgrim had or had not "any doubts," we shall never know. Apparently he was struck dumb, or dead, for all that we know. In any case, since Æsop records no more from the Stranger's lips, we can only assume that he buckled on his wings and flew back to his nearby Nowhere, there to remain until elected to Congress or recalled to Sagamore. But there was no escape. Our Colonel raised the window and shouted after the flying figure, that all the reporters might hear:

Get it perfectly clear in your head that if you nominate me it mustn't be because you think it is in my interest, but because you think it is in your interest and the interest of the Republican party, and because you think it is in the interest of the United States to do so.

And more than that, don't you do it if you expect me to pussy-foot on any single issue I have raised.

If, by this, Our Colonel meant the variegated aggregation of "policies," including the Initiative and Referendum and Recall of Judges, and the like, comprised in the famous Columbus Declaration, we hardly know what to infer unless it be that, instead of pussyfooting on them, he has definitely abandoned them. He continued:

And don't you nominate me unless you are prepared to take the position that Uncle Sam is to be strong enough to defend his rights and to defend every one of his people wherever these people are, and he can't be strong enough unless he prepares in advance.

Amen! to this.

I am not for war. On the contrary I abhor an unjust or a wanton war, and I would use every honorable expedient to avoid even a just war. But I feel with all my heart that you don't in the long run avoid war by making other people believe that you're afraid to fight for your own rights.

Sound and true! Nobody is "for war." Despite its persistent assertions to the contrary, even the *World* knows that Mr. Roosevelt is not. It also should be aware that the sure way to insure peace is to be able to maintain a rightful position and never, under any considerable circumstances, to be too proud to fight.

And don't forget that that isn't a course that provokes war; it is the only course that in the long run prevents war and secures national self-respect and guarantees the honor of this country and the rights of its citizens wherever they may be.

Again, we say, Amen! Passing over as purely rhetorical his strident but hazy distinctions between "just" and "unjust" conflicts, the "strong" and the "weak" as adversaries and, so forth, we find ourselves in full accord with this characteristic pronouncement of Our Colonel.

But that is not the point in issue. We are now considering personal politics, not National policies. And if ever anything was clear to our mind it is that, when he abandoned his conciliatory attitude and inaugurated a Campaign of Frightfulness against the Republican party, Our Colonel overreached so far that he cannot hope to find the common ground which he was seeking. Surely history does not record a political act so fully laden with audacity and presumption as that of a statesman, however heroic, who in one breath defiantly heralds his allegiance to a party which has become a remnant, and in the next arrogantly defines the terms upon which he will accept a nomination from the party which he assassinated. If Our Colonel had read his Bible more closely, he might have profited from the knowledge that it was not the Prodigal Son who possessed the fatted calf. As it is, he has succeeded only in directing attention to his own apostasy, in reviving fading resentments, in arousing old antagonisms and in stirring within the hearts of millions of sturdy Republicans an inflexible resolution to prevent him from finishing in 1916 the work he began in 1912, by swallowing the great organization to which he owes

his own political fame and fortune. It seemed in March that Roosevelt for President, tempered by Root for Secretary of State, might make effective appeal to the country. It does not seem so now. There was in March at least a possibility that the Republican party would turn to him for "Anything to beat Wilson." We perceive no such possibility now. The entire situation with respect to both Root and Roosevelt has changed in two months.

What then?

Nobody wants Hughes. Roosevelt prefers (as second choice) Root who could serve only four years. Root (we assume from recent happenings) would find his former chief more congenial. Barnes doesn't want him. Penrose doesn't. Mr. Henry P. Davison, of J. P. Morgan & Co., doesn't. Sir George Perkins, formerly of J. P. Morgan & Co. and now of the Harvester Company, doesn't. Mr. Robert Bacon, formerly of J. P. Morgan & Co. and now a most mutual friend of Mr. Root and Mr. Roosevelt, doesn't. Judge Gary doesn't. Mr. Thomas F. Ryan doesn't. Mr. John D. Archbold doesn't. Nicholas Murray Butler doesn't. President Wilson (Heaven help us!) doesn't. Colonel House (Heaven help us again!) doesn't. Mr. Burleson doesn't. Mr. McAdoo doesn't. Mr. Tumulty doesn't. Colonel Watterson doesn't. *The World* doesn't. *The Springfield Republican* maybe doesn't. He doesn't even want himself. Nobody wants Hughes—

Nobody but the People!

Is not that so? It is. You know it. We know it. They whom we have mentioned know it. Even Hughes *may* know it, though we have our doubts. But why *is* it? That is the question.

We can understand why many who are Republicans want Root, why many who are not Republicans want Roosevelt and why the great body of Democrats, headed by a small army of officeholders and pacifists, want Wilson. We can even understand why leading representatives of these three groups do not want Hughes. Mr. Joseph H. Choate, for example, after enumerating Mr. Root's exceptional qualifications and denouncing Mr. Roosevelt for having "deliberately attempted to destroy the Republican party to gratify his own selfish aims," says:

It should, as I think, be regarded as a fatal drawback to Justice Hughes's nomination that he is a Justice of the Supreme Court, a

court which must be kept forever inviolate from without or from within. Its spotless ermine should never be smirched in the muddy turmoil of politics. When a nomination for the Presidency was tendered to Justice Story, one of the greatest judges of that court, without his knowledge, he immediately wrote declining the nomination, and declaring that he would not accept the office, even with the unanimous consent of the whole people. That is the only attitude which the members of that court should hold, or which should be held toward them by the people. Hands off the Supreme Court!

To this the People say:

We, too, wish to keep the Supreme Court inviolate, and in ordinary circumstances we would not nominate a Justice for President. But there is no law against our doing so, and we deny the validity of the precedent cited. Justice Story did not decline to become a candidate because he was a member of the Court. His refusal was based upon personal disinclination, and nothing else. In point of fact, he had already determined to retire when his name was suggested, and when he wrote, according to his biographer, Mr. W. W. Story, that "the station of President of the United States would not tempt him from the professor's chair and the calm pursuit of jurisprudence." If there was in his mind any apprehension that acceptance would in any way "smirch the spotless ermine," the fact is not in evidence.

Nor obviously was such a consideration held to be binding by Justice McLean, who was a competitor of Fremont in 1856, nor by Chief Justice Chase, who was an avowed candidate in 1868, nor by Justice David Davis, for whom three electoral votes were cast in 1872. The mere fact, moreover, that no inhibition is imposed by the Constitution suffices to show that the Fathers had no intention of barring us, the People, from designating as our President any native-born citizen whom we should consider best equipped for the highest public service.

Granting, as we have admitted, the customary inadvisability of drawing a great judge from the Supreme bench and granting further the impropriety of such an one becoming an active candidate, it is our inalienable right at this most critical juncture in our country's progress to put at the head of the Nation any citizen who most adequately satisfies all requirements, and it is no less the bounden duty of that citizen to answer such a call. Incidentally, we are convinced that the election of Justice Hughes as President

would be far more likely to clarify "the muddy turmoil of politics" than to bespatter the judicial ermine—a consummation devoutly to be wished.

But what does Justice Hughes stand for? Less vociferously than the adherents of Our Colonel, but with equal insistence, Mr. Choate continues:

Besides this, Justice Hughes has never had any experience in foreign affairs, which now most critically involve our national honor and safety, and, what is more, no man knows what his views are on this or any other of the leading questions which now agitate the people of the United States. Under the circumstances, can the party which in this election expects to resume the reins of government afford to select him? His judicial record is perfect. Why should not he and his party and the whole people be content with that as his one and only proper place for life?

And the People answer:

Mr. Roosevelt has had more "experience in foreign affairs" than any other man now living. Would Mr. Choate, in consequence, maintain that "our national honor and safety" would be more adequately conserved by him than by Mr. Hughes? True it is beyond question that Mr. Hughes has never directed the course of his country through a world embroilment. Neither has Mr. Root. Nor has Mr. Roosevelt. President Wilson alone has the advantage of that experience. Is it for this reason that Mr. Choate demands that he be superseded?

Mr. Hughes is as great a judge as Mr. Root is a lawyer. During the past seven years he has had at least an equal experience in dealing officially with international legal problems. As students of political history, they stand upon an even plane. Is it not safe to assume that Mr. Hughes, a sedulous official, has studied as closely as Mr. Root, a private citizen, the subjects vital to the welfare of the Nation, which have grown out of the great war? Would Mr. Choate feel less assured of ability and virility in the conduct of the affairs of the Nation by Mr. Hughes, at 55, as President, and Mr. Root, as Secretary of State, than by Mr. Root, at 72, as President, laden with the enormous burden of that great office? Can Mr. Choate suggest a stronger combination or one more satisfying to us, the People, than that which we have indicated? Would he not, in truth and candor, concede that Mr. Root, at three-score-and-twelve, could render in-

finitely greater service as Secretary of State, charged only with the management of foreign affairs, than as President, grievously overwhelmed by domestic problems as well? So we, the People, soberly and sincerely believe. And is it unjust or ungrateful on our part to withhold from Mr. Root the greatest nominal reward for the quite splendid services which he has rendered? Is not a high public position what its holder makes of it? Is Daniel Webster overshadowed in fame by his chief? Or Henry Clay? Or John C. Calhoun? Or James G. Blaine?

Is it quite accurate to say that "no man knows what Justice Hughes's views are on this or any other of the questions which now agitate the people of the United States"? Do not his work as Governor of the State of New York, his "*perfect judicial record*" and his many utterances in published documents and before the people constitute as complete a portrayal as one could desire of his attitude towards all fundamental questions related to popular government? Is it necessary, is it possible, to be more specific with respect to unforeseen problems of the future or even known problems of the present? We are well aware that Mr. Root, no less strongly than Mr. Roosevelt himself, disapproves of President Wilson's conduct. Upon this point his trenchant and scathing speech left no room for doubt. Mr. Hughes may or may not fully coincide with each and all of the judgments voiced in that terrific arraignment. Does it matter? We, the People, are less concerned with the past than with the present and more especially with the future.

Mr Root depicted in telling phrase Mr. Wilson's deplorable blundering in Mexico, but he did not tell us what he himself would do *now* or later. He could not. He does not know. He criticised caustically the Administration's dealings with European Powers, but he did not say what he would say or do to Germany *today* or tomorrow. He could not. He does not know. Nor does Mr. Roosevelt. Nor does Mr. Hughes. But does Mr. Choate really believe for one moment—is there the slightest indication in his whole unblemished record?—that Mr. Hughes would fail to meet any situation involving our Nation's dignity and honor with an intelligence, a courage, a spirit and a disregard of consequences to himself equal to that of Mr. Root or of Mr. Roosevelt or of any other living American? Has Mr. Choate any doubt as to that? We, the People, have not.

That Mr. Justice Hughes not only "should be" but is "content" to remain in his "one and only proper place for life," our venerable and venerated former Ambassador may rest assured. That the managing directors of the Republican party would be no less pleased to have him stay there is certain. That Mr. Henry P. Davison's Committee of Seventy would be easily reconciled to such a happening we may take for granted. That Sir George Perkins would so far forget himself as to raise no voice in protest we can readily believe. That the Administration is willing to the verge of anxiety that he be not disturbed we have a shrewd suspicion. But, measurably because of these very circumstances, though in a broad sense for much larger reasons, we, the People, do not. *We want Hughes.*

Alas, it cannot be. The New York *World*, that "always drastically independent institution" which can "never belong to any party" but must "always remain devoted to the public welfare," says so. But why? Because "Wall Street is for Root," but since it cannot get him it "will take Roosevelt." The *World* continues with characteristic logic and convincingness:

It might be ready to take Hughes too, but Hughes is handicapped in such a way that it is almost impossible for him to obtain the nomination. Unlike the other candidates, he can make no active fight for delegates.

And has made none.

His judicial position forbids.

It does.

He cannot announce his candidacy or discuss publicly any of the issues of the campaign.

Cannot and has not.

He cannot say whether he is for or against the President's foreign policies.

He probably could not even define them.

He cannot say whether he is for or against preparedness.

Unlike the President, who can say the one and do the other.

Nor can he permit his friends to interpret his attitude toward the issues of the campaign, or to solicit support in his behalf, or to enter into any bargain for delegates.

Quite so.

Any other candidate could accept the nomination at the end of a long and bitter contest. Hughes could not.

Yes, he stands alone.

If he were nominated by acclamation as the unanimous choice of his party in a convention that gave free expression to the sentiment of the Republican voters, then he could honorably accept.

Thanks!

No charge could be made that he had dragged the United States Supreme Court into the mire of politics.

True!

Mr. Choate's warning would have no force.

As we have said.

If Hughes were ready, like Roosevelt, to take the nomination on any terms, in any circumstances, on any platform, and by any arrangement, he might control the convention, but that kind of Hughes fortunately does not exist.

Right you are. In point of fact, says the *World* in another issue:

Justice Hughes is essentially the Wilson type. His outlook on public life is essentially the Wilson outlook. His theory of public duty is essentially the Wilson theory.

What, then, is the purpose of nominating Justice Hughes? To continue the Wilson Administration under Republican auspices? To replace a Democratic Wilson with a Republican Wilson?

Now with Roosevelt there is an issue. No two men could be more unlike than Wilson and Roosevelt, except Hughes and Roosevelt.

Wilson's attitude toward government is incorrigibly American. His spirit is the spirit of Franklin, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

Clearly, no further information as to what Hughes "stands for" is required. As between the Justice and the President, a "drastically independent" public journal which can "never belong to any party" could have no preference. And yet, bewilderingly, the *World* not only vehemently demands the nomination of Roosevelt, regardless of possible consequences to the country, but sapiently insists that Roosevelt will never permit his friends to vote for Hughes, and that, if Hughes should be nominated, Roosevelt "will find an excuse to run against the man whom he refers to in private conversation as 'that Baptist hypocrite.'"

We, the People, who have cherished Our Colonel in the past and continue to wish him well, have no means of learning and no wish to publish what may have been uttered "in private conversation." If it should develop, upon trustworthy testimony, that Mr. Roosevelt did actually and deliberately apply to Mr. Justice Hughes the opprobrious term quoted, our disregard of its designed effect would be equaled only by the sense of shame upon its author which would possess all decent minds. While, moreover, we do not believe, and do not believe the *World* believes, that Mr. Roosevelt would strive to re-elect Mr. Wilson by running independently to defeat Mr. Hughes, our conviction is positive that such an attempt would avail nothing more and nothing else than the utter humiliation of the hapless head of a decimated company. No Republican and no Progressive, barring such as might feel that President Wilson should be upheld, would have either reason or excuse for refusal to vote for Mr. Hughes,—and not a corporal's guard could be persuaded to the contrary.

There were no overshadowing international problems in 1908, when, as now, we, the People, wanted Governor Hughes in preference to the puissant President's successful candidate, but there were domestic issues which still live. And one desirous of knowing where Hughes stood had only to ask the question of the man who "would not preserve availability at the expense of candor." He was unaffectedly proud of the great organization of which he had been a member all his life.

"The Republican party has maintained the national honor," he said then, as if in anticipation of an issue in 1916, "and under its direction American diplomacy has attained the highest levels of honorable purpose and distinguished achievement."

"A protective tariff is essential to the interests of our wage earners," he said, "in that it makes possible the payment of wages on a scale to which we are accustomed in this country and thus maintains our American standard of living. Hence the difference in the cost of production here and abroad is the fundamental consideration. But I do not believe in making this policy a cover for exorbitant rates or for obtaining special privileges from the Government which are not based upon consideration of the general welfare. I believe that the tariff should be revised, and in order to effect

whatever readjustment may be necessary to make the tariff schedules consistent with the principles underlying the protective policy, I favor the appointment of an expert commission, so that the facts may be ascertained without delay and that Congress may dispose of the matter in the fairest possible manner."

"With regard to the Filipinos," he said, "we are placed under the most sacred obligations. In justice to them and in justice to ourselves we must omit no effort to prepare them for self-government."

"We are devoted," he continued, as if the thought of the Philippines had suggested it, "to the interests of peace and we cherish no policy of aggression. The maintenance of our ideals is our surest protection. It is our constant aim to live in friendship with all nations and to realize the aims of a free government, secure from the interruptions of strife and the wastes of war. It is entirely consistent with these aims, and it is our duty, to make adequate provision for our defense and to maintain the efficiency of our army and navy. And this I favor."

He recognized throughout the country and personally shared "a wholesome sentiment" for relief from boss domination.

"That sentiment," he said, "is that the instrumentalities of party management shall not be so arranged as to facilitate the purposes of those who would subvert government to their selfish advantage. It is a sentiment that demands for the members of political parties simple and direct methods by which they can exercise their just rights in determining party choices. It insists that the work and preferences of party managers shall be brought to the test of party opinion freely expressed, to the end that leadership that dishonors the party may be more readily overthrown and that it may be easier to give effective support to honest party management in the public interest."

"It has been stated," he said on another occasion, "that I have not paid sufficient attention to those who are politically active and who bear the burden and heat of the day in political campaigns. It has been said that I regard political activity as a disqualification for public office.

"Now no cause can be advanced without hard work, and it must be the object of zealous devotion. I esteem those who in an honorable manner work for the party. Political activ-

ity by virtue of the experience and knowledge of affairs gained in it so far from being a disqualification may be a most important qualification for office. But I want that political activity to be of such a character as to leave a man free and independent in the dignity of his manhood to perform the duties of office, if appointed, unembarrassed by improper influences and unaffected by accumulated obligations."

More significant than these or many other utterances which might be cited is the living fact of Mr. Hughes's undoubted sincerity and perfect rectitude. We, the People, care more for what a man is than for what he says. If we know him through and through and believe in him, as we believed in Washington, in Lincoln and in Cleveland, we do not need to be informed of his opinion upon every subject that may come up, from peonage in Mexico to ruffled birds in the West Indies. We do not think Mr. Hughes is a better American than Mr. Roosevelt, but we think he is just as good, twice as sound and many times as trustworthy. We do not rank him as high intellectually as Mr. Root, but we perceive none other who surpasses him in this regard, and we cannot but consider the hazard, and perhaps the wrong, of placing the tremendous burdens of the Presidency upon the shoulders of a man who is living on "borrowed time." We do not know, indeed we doubt, that he is as keen and shrewd in mind as Mr. Wilson, but we think he is more dependable, and somehow or other we feel that he is *more of a man*,—"a regular feller," as they say on Cherry Hill, as contrasted—well, with whatever one's opinion happens to be.

So we, the People, say or think.

Do you doubt it? Ask the man in the street, on the sidewalk, in the car, on the subway, in the Pullman, on the jitney, in the vestibule after service, on the golf links before or after, downtown or uptown, in or out of clubs not dominated by masters of finance, in Hartford, Springfield or Peacham, in wealth-wallowing Pittsburgh even, or Columbus, or on the farms of Iowa, in Oregon or Washington, anywhere and everywhere, uphill and down dale, in this broad land, ask yourself, your wife, your plethoric uncle, your spinster aunt—and what do you find?

Some who distrust the supporters of Root; many who are angry at Roosevelt; not a few, inclusive of Democrats, who are sick of Wilson; none whose countenance fails to brighten at the mention of Hughes.

But—"will he take it"?

Ay, there's the rub. God save the Court! implores Mr. Choate. It is too late for him to speak, shouts the *World*. We cannot beat a man with no man, say the mighty leaders. Where would we be at, without an understanding? queries Wall Street. Nevertheless, patiently but persistently, we have to ask *Will* he, despite the fact that many think it might be safer to say *Would* he? We have already recorded faithfully the judgment of ourselves, the People, respecting the mutual obligations of Citizen and State. Now let us examine more closely the more specific circumstantial evidence.

Be it observed then, at the outset, that Mr. Hughes has never directly sought, or even been an inferential candidate for, public office. When, in 1906, immediately following the insurance investigation, he was first "prominently mentioned" for Governor, the Republican politicians became as "nervous and excited" as all of us who advocated Preparedness appeared to the President a year or so ago. Was he a candidate or was he not? Would he accept or would he not? Even then as now. On August 22nd he sailed for Europe, remarking pleasantly to the reporters on the steamer that he had no ambitions beyond what the practice of law could afford him. On September 26th he was nominated, accepted, and was the only candidate on the Republican ticket who won at the polls. There was much opposition to his renomination in 1908 because of his veto of the popular two-cent fare bill and of his opposition to race-track gambling. Again he did not turn a hand, heedless of the consequences, but received 827 out of 1007 votes and was re-elected.

"I do not seek office," he had said in 1907. "To me public office means a burden of responsibility—a burden of incessant toil at times almost intolerable—which under honorable conditions and at the command of the people it may be a duty, and even a pleasure, to assume, but it is far from being an object of ambition. I have not sought, nor shall I seek, directly or indirectly, to influence the selection or the vote of any delegate to any convention."

That was Mr. Hughes's position then. It is his position now. "I am not a candidate, actively or tacitly," he wrote to Mr. Henry Wood, "and, in view of my judicial office, I do not feel that I have any right to take part in any political discussion." In a word—and this, we are fully con-

vinced, may be taken as fact if not as law and gospel—this old-fashioned man holds firmly to the old-fashioned idea that the responsibilities of the Presidency are so great that it ought not to be sought and *must not be declined*.

Such is our interpretation of the sober thought and ardent wish of the American people. Never since this Republic demanded that George Washington become its first President has there appeared so striking an instance of the Office seeking the Man. Never has been a call so peremptory, never a constantly swelling force so certain, in our judgment, to prove irresistible. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or not, the Will of the People will prevail, and Charles Evans Hughes will be the next Republican candidate for President of the United States. And the overpowering issue will be one of men—of ability, of judgment, of fidelity, but above all of character.

Hughes or Wilson?

That will be all. When the lively wedding in Chicago shall have been supplemented by the sedate funeral in St. Louis, Patriotism must dictate a choice between the two.

O Lord, save Thy People!

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES was 54 years old on the 11th of April last. He was born in Glens Falls, N. Y., on the 11th of April, 1862. When it is said that his father, David Charles Hughes, was a Baptist preacher having charge of the village flocks of Glens Falls and Sandy Hill, near by, and that his sole revenue was the salary usually paid to such a country gentleman, it is not necessary to emphasize the fact that Mr. Hughes began his life, as the majority of American men who have gone farthest and won the highest esteem of their countrymen began theirs, in the rather bleak but stimulating air of a home where money is scarce.

In one respect Mr. Hughes had the advantage over many American boys whose parents were poor. He did not have to fight a long, up-hill battle to get an education. Before his father was ordained a minister at Wesleyan University, he had been a teacher of Latin, Greek and English at West River Collegiate Institute in Maryland. Moreover, Mr. Hughes's

mother was a finely educated woman. Her name was Mary C. Connelly when Pastor Hughes first met her. She was the daughter of a highly respected physician in Delaware County, New York, and at Claverack Institute, from which she was graduated, she had won distinction for proficiency in the languages, and, what is rather unusual in young girls, for decided strength in mathematics. Thus we have not very far to seek for the source of that taste for mathematics which is so pronounced a part of Mr. Justice Hughes's mental equipment, and which perhaps is not disassociated with those powers of continued concentration of thought for which he is remarkable.

Naturally, the son and only child of such parents did not have to get out and struggle for his early education; it began right at home, and it began as soon as he was able to absorb it. Both his father and his mother taught him languages and mathematics in the little home parsonage. However, he attended the public schools later on. At Oswego, where his father labored for a time as a preacher after leaving Glens Falls, he went into the primary grade school, and at Newark, New Jersey, where the elder Hughes had a subsequent pastorate, he attended the high school, as he did a few years after in New York, when the family went there to live. But in the meantime the home tuition continued. The Rev. David Hughes wanted his son to follow in his own footsteps and become a Baptist preacher. So, concurrently with his earlier instruction, his father grounded him well in the rudiments of theological lore. But law, to young Hughes, was ever a more alluring topic than theology, and when, after a year in Colgate, he entered the sophomore class at Brown University, it was with a well-fixed purpose of becoming a lawyer and not a preacher.

With such a college preparation, and with habits of study thus inculcated in him from childhood, it is not surprising that he emerged from Brown with flying colors. As a matter of fact, he took about all the honors there were—honors in the classics, the Dunn premium in English, and, above all, one of the two Carpenter prizes given to the two students in each graduating class showing the greatest promise as based on scholarship and character. He had the reputation, too, of not studying very much at Brown. He did not have to. His home instruction and mental discipline had been so thorough that he was at a marked advantage over most of his

fellow students. He had plenty of time for college amusements, and he went in for them heartily. He was an enthusiastic fraternity man, and has kept up his interest in Delta Upsilon during all the thirty-five years that have elapsed since he graduated from Brown.

It was not until he was out of college that the really hard grind of work definitely began. First of all, he had to earn the money to enable him to get his legal education. To do this he taught Greek and mathematics in Delaware Academy at Delhi, New York, studying meantime in the law office of Judge Gleason. Then he went to Columbia Law School, reading at the same time in the office of the Hon. Stewart L. Woodford, subsequently Minister to Madrid at an interesting epoch in our relations with Spain. At Columbia he duplicated his experience at Brown, winning the highest honor, the Prize Fellowship, which carries with it an appointment as tutor at five hundred dollars a year. He did the tutoring and he earned the very acceptable money. From 1884 till 1887 he worked as a law clerk by day and taught a law class in Columbia by night.

But he had long before attracted the notice of that eminent lawyer, Walter S. Carter, noted as a collector of etchings and of bright young men in the legal profession. In 1888 Mr. Hughes was made full member of the firm of Carter, Hughes and Cravath, and a certain love affair, long smouldering but very earnest, culminated soon after the law firm arrangement. On the 5th of December, 1888, Mr. Hughes and Miss Annette Carter, daughter of the young man's senior law partner, were married. Miss Carter was a graduate of Wellesley College and fully sympathetic with the decided literary tastes of Mr. Hughes, for the learned Justice is not wholly given over to mathematics and legal problems. He likes Balzac, the elder Dumas, good detective yarns, and is a great admirer of Mr. Dooley. It may not be generally suspected, but he is really blessed with a liberal sense of humor. Like most men of intense purpose and an insatiable appetite for work, he has paid the penalty in a certain fixed sternness of expression, and the reputation of being an "iceberg." But he is a capital story-teller none the less, and on his campaigning tours he liberated reserve stores of warmth, humor, and even sentiment, which few had dreamed that he was capable of harboring.

"If they perform an autopsy on me," he once said, "I

hope they will find something besides sawdust and briefs inside."

Though not quite what has been called a "clubable" man, but rather a home-loving, retiring temperament, he is by no means an "iceberg." He likes to hunt in the Maine woods and to climb mountains in Switzerland. For thirteen successive years he never missed the Swiss trip until he was Governor. During two of the trying years he was in Albany he had but one vacation—eleven days in the woods.

But hard work has its limits, and as early as 1891 it had all but claimed its toll from Charles E. Hughes. He had egregiously overdone the thing. That was the reason he accepted the law professorship in Cornell University. To be sure, he worked at about his accustomed pace while there, but it was a new field. It served in lieu of a vacation from the trying New York legal grind. But Mr. Carter wanted him back, and in 1893 he returned, and again plunged into his law work. It was soon after this that Senator Stevens picked him as the man he wanted for counsel in the gas investigation.

It is idle to rehearse now either what he did to the gas companies or to the insurance companies. Both events are of sufficiently recent date to remain vividly in people's minds. What the relentless questioner sought to uncover in both cases was such a revelation of unwarranted practices as would form a basis for remedial legislation. He refused to be diverted an instant from this object. He sought no punishments, no revenges, no political capital. He would permit no efforts in either of these directions to confuse or degrade the high purposes of the inquiry. Those purposes he in full measure attained, and in attaining them emerged from a species of obscurity to the status of a commanding figure within and beyond the borders of the State.

Of political ambition he was probably utterly devoid. He said he was, and every act and utterance of his confirmed what he said. In politics he was a Republican by inheritance and conviction. His father was a fervent Republican, dating back in his party inspiration to the days of Lincoln,—a Republican, moreover, who never failed to do his duty as a citizen on election day, and he voted naught but the straight ticket.

But the masterful Republican leaders did not want him for a gubernatorial candidate in 1906. Nor did there ever

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come from Mr. Hughes the slightest intimation that he wanted the nomination. During all the discussion he held himself aloof. He would not say he wanted the nomination. He would not permit anybody to present his claims or his availability. It was a matter solely for the people of the State to decide. The party was split wide open at that time with factional fights. There was nobody else that had the remotest chance of election, a fact which was afterward sufficiently demonstrated at the polls when Mr. Hughes was the one Republican on the State ticket who was elected. It had gone to the people for decision, and they decided it.

As Governor, the bitterness he evoked among some of the leaders is matter of history—that and the unswerving confidence of the people back of the leaders and the leaders' masters. He governed out in the open, for one thing. He abandoned the inner seclusion of the Governor's suite in the Albany capitol, and moved his desk out into the big reception room. If anybody had anything to say to him as Governor they said it there or it went unsaid. For days the newspapers had columns of comment and good-humored chaff over the curious new departure.

Then came the veto of the two-cent fare bill, because no facts were presented to justify its adoption; the passing of the Public Utilities bill to provide for the gathering of such data; and then the race-track gambling bill. Long and keen were the knives that were out to prevent the Governor's renomination in 1908. But the people still had the bit in their teeth. The leaders no longer led. Mr. Hughes was nominated by a vote of 827 in a convention of 1007 delegates. Thus Charles Evans Hughes was again elected to the Governorship of his State, and from Governor he was appointed Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

THE SUBMARINE CONTROVERSY WITH GERMANY

THE WARNING

(Bryan to Gerard, February 10, 1915)

"If such a deplorable situation should arise [destruction of American life or American ships upon the high seas], the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be con-

strained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

THE REPLY

(Von Jagow to Gerard, February 16, 1915)

"Germany must, in the exigency into which she has been unlawfully forced, make her measures effective, at all events, in order thereby to compel her adversary to conduct maritime warfare in accordance with international law, and thus to re-establish the freedom of the seas, which she has ever advocated and for which she is fighting likewise to-day."

THE EFFECT

On American Trade

(Grey to Page, March 15, 1915)

"I must emphasize again that this measure (suppression of German trade) is a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods, repugnant to all law and morality, which * * * Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war, and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating."

On American Life

(Bryan to Gerard, May 13, 1915, in reference to the destruction of the *Lusitania* and *Falaba*, and attacks on American steamers *Cushing* and *Gulflight*)

THE DEMANDS

"It [the Government of the United States] confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will make reparation, so far as reparation is possible, for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended."

THE THREAT

"The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any

act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

THE ANSWER

(Von Jagow to Gerard, May 28, 1915)

"With regard to the loss of life when the British passenger steamer *Lusitania* was sunk, the German Government has already expressed its deep regret to the neutral Governments concerned that nationals of those countries lost their lives on that occasion. * * * In view of these facts [alleged presence of guns, subsequently disproved, and instructions to British vessels to use neutral flags and markings], which are satisfactorily known to it, the Imperial German Government is unable to consider English merchant vessels any longer as 'undefended territory' in the zone of maritime war designated by the admiralty staff of the Imperial German Navy; the German commanders are consequently no longer in a position to observe the rules of capture otherwise usual, and with which they invariably complied before this. * * * The company [by shipping ammunition] thereby wantonly caused the death of so many passengers."

THE REITERATION

(Lansing to Gerard, June 9, 1915)

"The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the fifteenth of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation."

THE COUNTER-RESPONSE

(Von Jagow to Gerard, July 8, 1915)

"In particular, the Imperial Government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board. * * * Consequently, accidents suffered by neutrals on enemy ships in this area of war cannot well be judged differently from accidents to which neutrals are at all times exposed at the seat of war on land, when they betake themselves into dangerous localities in spite of previous warning."

THE REJOINDER

(Lansing to Gerard, July 21, 1915)

"In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the right of retaliation in defense of its acts, and in view of the manifest possibility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania*, or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless destruction of human life by an illegal act."

THE DECLARATION

"Friendship itself prompts it [the Government of the United States] to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

THE ASSURANCE

(Von Bernstorff to Lansing, September 1, 1915, following destruction of *Arabic*)

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

THE *Arabic*

(Von Jagow to Gerard, September 17, 1915)

"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the *Arabic*."

(Von Bernstorff to Lansing, October 5, 1915)

"The attack of the submarine, therefore [upon the *Arabic*], was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly. Under these circumstances my Government is

prepared to pay an indemnity for the American lives which, to its deep regret, have been lost on the *Arabic*."

THE *Orduna*

(Von Jagow to Gerard, December 9, 1915)

"The first attack on the *Orduna* by a torpedo was not in accordance with existing instructions, which provide that large passenger steamers are only to be torpedoed after previous warning and after the rescuing of passengers and crew. The failure to observe the instructions was based on an error, which is, at any rate, comprehensible, and a repetition of which appears to be out of the question, in view of the more explicit instructions issued in the meantime. Moreover, the commanders of submarines have been reminded that it is their duty to exercise greater care and to observe carefully the orders issued."

THE *Persia*

(Von Bernstorff to Lansing, January 7, 1916)

"German submarines are therefore permitted to destroy enemy merchant vessels in the Mediterranean—i. e., passenger as well as freight ships, as far as they do not try to escape or offer resistance—only after passengers and crew have been accorded safety. * * * If commanders of German submarines should not have obeyed the orders given to them, they will be punished; furthermore, the German Government will make reparation for damage caused by death of, or injuries to, American citizens."

THE SUBMARINE CONTROVERSY WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE *Ancona*

(Lansing to Penfield, for delivery to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, December 6, 1915)

THE DEMANDS

"As the good relations of the two countries must rest upon a common regard for law and humanity, the Government of the United States cannot be expected to do otherwise than to demand that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the *Ancona* as an illegal and indefensible act; that the officer who perpetrated the deed be

punished; and that reparation, by the payment of an indemnity, be made for the citizens of the United States who were killed or injured by the attack on the vessel."

THE REPLY

(Burian to Penfield, December 15, 1915)

"As is not difficult to perceive, the presentation of the facts in the case in the aforesaid note leaves room for many doubts; and even if this presentation were correct in all points, and the most rigorous legal conception were applied to the judgment of the case, it does not in any way sufficiently warrant attaching blame to the commanding officer of the war vessel or to the Imperial and Royal Government."

THE COUNTER-REPLY

(Lansing to Penfield, December 19, 1915)

"The Government of the United States, therefore, finds no other course open to it but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government responsible for the act of its naval commander, and to renew the definite but respectful demands made in its communication of the 6th of December, 1915."

THE REJOINDER

(Burian to Penfield, December 29, 1915)

"Also as concerns the principle expressed in the very esteemed note that hostile private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons on board having been placed in safety, the Imperial and Royal Government is able substantially to assent to this view of the Washington Cabinet. * * * Should the more precise circumstances under which the American citizens [on the *Ancona*] were injured be unknown to the Government of the United States, due to a lack of the proper material evidence, the Imperial and Royal Government, in consideration of the humanely deeply deplorable incident and guided by the desire of again manifesting to the Government of the United States its friendly sentiments, would be readily willing to overlook this gap in this evidence, and to extend the indemnity also to those injuries, the direct cause of which could not be ascertained. While the Imperial and Royal Government may well regard the *Ancona* case as cleared up by the foregoing representations, it, at the same

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time, reserves to itself for a future time the discussion of the difficult questions of international law in connection with submarine warfare."

SUBMARINES AS COMMERCE DESTROYERS

(Bryan to Gerard, May 13, 1915)

"Manifestly, submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity."

(Lansing to Gerard, July 21, 1915)

"The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operation as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare."

ARMED MERCHANTMEN

(Lansing to Von Bernstorff, September 19, 1915)

"A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the character of a ship of war."

-(Lansing to Allied Ambassadors, January 18, 1916)

"I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of under-seas craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly."

(Von Jagow to Gerard, February 10, 1916)

"In the circumstances set forth above, enemy merchantmen armed with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce. Therefore, the German naval forces will receive orders, within a short period, paying consideration to the interests of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as belligerents."

(Woodrow Wilson to Senator Stone, February 24, 1916)

"The course which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the future with

regard to underseas warfare seems, for the moment, to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with the explicit assurances recently given us by those Powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas, that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. * * * But, in any event, our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war."

THE REAL RESULTS

FOR GERMANY

Continuance of submarine operations in accordance with the original policy laid down by Admiral von Tirpitz.

Maintenance of friendly relations with the United States through vague and indefinite promises.

Reduction by the United States of its first demands in the case of the *Lusitania* as a result of secret negotiations yet to be given to the public.

Time.

FOR THE UNITED STATES

Disavowal in the single case of the *Arabic*.

Expression of willingness to pay damages in the case of the American steamers *Cushing*, *Gulflight* and *Nebraskan*.

Promises of indemnity for American citizens drowned, killed or injured.

Assurances of future good conduct the character of which have provoked discussion.

Trouble.

AFTER THE WAR—WHAT?

AFTER the war, what—for America? It is not too early to ask. The end of the war may come as suddenly and as unexpectedly as its beginning. It may come soon, or it may be long delayed. In either case it is essential that we shall be prepared to meet it; and at present we are not thus prepared. It is probable that we shall have much more need of special preparation for its end than we had for its beginning. For we needed at its beginning only a reassertion of neutrality;

and a resolute maintenance of our rights. But at its end we shall have to meet a general readjustment of the industry, commerce and finance of the world, and perhaps of political conditions; and we may have to meet something still more serious.

The war has already caused an enormous disturbance of international trade. From that the United States has largely profited. We have developed a vast trade in military munitions, and a less but still considerable trade in other commodities. The end of the war will, of course, mean the end of the munitions trade. It is an interesting and important matter of speculation, to what extent it will also mean a reversion of non-military trade to the old lines, or will mean the confirmation of this country in its present gains. Certainly the United States seems now to have a unique opportunity to make great and lasting gains in many directions. It will be recalled that as a result of our Civil War our ocean carrying trade was almost entirely lost, and was transferred to other nations, chiefly to Great Britain. It is to be considered whether there is not a somewhat similar opportunity now, for a measurable retransfer of the European carrying trade back to the American flag. At any rate, the United States ought not to neglect a single item of possible preparation to secure such gains.

Speculation concerning the end of the war turns chiefly, however, upon the supposition or the suggestion of a military menace to the United States from that side which shall be victorious in the European conflict. Upon this opinion is divided, with much emphasis. Pacifists, of course, scout the notion of any menace whatever. They insist that no European Power has any designs or any desire whatever to attack America; and that if any had, it would not be able to do so because of the exhaustion and prostration which it will be suffering at the end of this war. Neither of these propositions is convincing, nor capable of satisfactory demonstration.

There are, on the contrary, strong reasons for believing that at least one great European Power has long cherished both the desire and the design, if not of bluntly attempting the conquest of America, at least of so traversing our principles and impairing our material interests as to compel either our humiliating submission to its dictation or a clash of arms and a struggle for mastery. It has been an open

secret that Germany is as intent upon getting "a place in the sun" in the Western as in the Eastern hemisphere. We need not look so far afield as the German colonization of several states in Southern Brazil. The covetous eye of that Power has for years been fixed upon places much nearer to us, within striking distance of our own shores, around the Caribbean Sea or upon or near the Isthmus of Panama.

For a long time Germany has been negotiating for the acquisition of the Dutch West Indies, either through direct purchase from the Netherlands, or through the annexation of the Netherlands to the German Empire. Once, if not twice, German influence at Copenhagen has defeated plans for our acquisition of the Danish West Indies, though both the United States and the islands in question as well as the Danish Government earnestly desired the transfer. The German intrigues at Bogota in 1902 were notorious, their aim being to prevent our acquisition of the Panama Canal, and to promote and effect the acquisition of it by a German corporation which would be an *alter ego* of the Imperial Government itself. It was largely German influence that caused Colombia to reject the Hay-Herran treaty, though in doing so it overreached itself and provoked the Panama revolution. Germany also attempted to gain a foothold in Venezuela through very much the same tactics which she employed for getting a foothold in China at Kiaochow, and was prevented from so doing only by the American Government, which sent to the Wilhelmstrasse a curt ultimatum, to the effect that if Germany persisted in sending the threatened military expedition, it would be met off the Venezuelan coast by Admiral Dewey with the American battle fleet, ready for instant action. It would be folly to assume that Germany's mind has changed, that she is now less desirous of securing a place in the American sun, and that her victory in the European war would not mean a prompt renewal of such tactics, in a more militant fashion than ever before.

But, say the pacifists, Germany would be too much exhausted by her struggles in Europe to be able to undertake a war against America. The examples of history warrant no such fond belief. Seldom has a victorious nation been so exhausted as to be incapable presently of beginning another war; and seldom has a Power hesitated, for cause, to take on a new antagonist in a war in which it was already engaged. To go back no further than our own early history:

The Seven Years' War did not so exhaust England and France that they were not both ready for another war a few years later. When Great Britain was at war with her Thirteen Colonies, and was so hard pressed in it that she was desperately seeking mercenary levies for her armies in several European countries and was getting them alone in Germany, she did not hesitate also to wage war against France. Less than a score of years later, years of exhausting strife and a gigantic war still continuing did not restrain France from provoking America to war, though John Adams refused to yield to the provocation. In 1812 Great Britain was suffering the strain of many years of costly war, and was actually engaged in a gigantic life or death struggle with the most formidable adversary in the world; yet those things did not restrain her from engaging in another war with the United States. At much later dates, within our own recollection, the Danish war did not incapacitate but rather prepared Prussia for her war with Austria, and her war with Austria in turn left her ready and eager to provoke war with France. Japan's war with China was not a bar against but rather a prelude to her greater war with Russia. Our own Civil War, gigantic and costly as it was, left us not so prostrated and exhausted that we were not quite ready to try conclusions with the French Empire, unless Louis Napoleon would speedily withdraw from Mexico; which he discreetly did.

If, therefore, Germany had any designs of American aggressions before this war, as it is impossible to avoid suspecting, we must believe that the result of her victory in this war would inevitably be to promote them, to encourage her in cherishing them, and to expedite her actual attempt in that direction. We must remember that she has more than one long-standing grudge against us. They began, perhaps in 1898, when she instigated the attempt at meddling by a combination of European Powers in our controversy with Spain over Cuba, and when she got from President McKinley a most courteous but most effective snubbing. They were increased by the notorious Dewey-Diederichs episode at Manila; by our trumping of her trick at Panama; and by our peremptory ordering her to keep her *pickelhauben* out of Venezuela. We have no notion that anything in the American attitude in the present war has materially mollified her feelings toward us.

There would be, moreover, at least one prime reason for seeking a war with America, not merely in spite of but actually because of the great European struggle through which she had just passed and which had been so enormously costly to her. That is, the impossibility of extorting from the European countries indemnities sufficient to pay all her war bills, and the consequent desire to get at little cost a huge indemnity also from the United States. The tribute which she has levied upon Belgian cities is an earnest of what she would levy upon American cities if she had the chance; and that she could have the chance in case of her victory over the European Allies there can be little question. That she could eventually and permanently conquer the whole United States is not for a moment to be believed. But the best military and naval authorities are agreed that against our present defensive establishment, and against any that we can have for several years to come, it would be not only possible but easy for her to place New York, Boston and other Atlantic Coast cities at the mercy of her guns, and indeed to occupy them with her troops. It is all very well to say that we should drive her out again. Yes; but a few days' possession of those cities would be sufficient for the collecting of such tribute as would make Belgium's seem picayune by the side of it. If then she were compelled to retire, and to scuttle out of the country, she would take the loot with her across the Atlantic, and if we sought to recover it and to take revenge upon her, we should have to do so by the practically impossible means of crossing the ocean and conquering her at home. It would be perfectly practicable and highly profitable, and we may add that it would be quite probable, for Germany thus to make a raid for revenue only upon the American coast.

Now all this may be regarded as out of the question, for the reason that Germany is not going to win the European war. We are firmly of that opinion ourselves. Yet there is no absolute assurance of it; and though there be only one chance in a hundred of Germany's winning, the consequences of her doing so would be so transcendently menacing that it would be criminal folly for us deliberately to remain unprepared for even so remote a contingency. We know not when the war may end, nor how. But this we do know, that it behooves us not merely as American patriots but also simply as rational beings to be as fully

prepared as possible for that end, whenever it may come and whatever it may be.

FRANCE, OLD AND NEW

FRANCE remains the great surprise of the war. There was really no occasion to be surprised at the marvellous degree of preparedness and efficiency which Germany displayed at the outset, and which she has maintained. We cannot admire it too greatly, for the world has never seen anything quite its equal; but we cannot wonder at it. It had been taken for granted in advance. Neither is there cause to be astonished at the preparedness and efficiency of the British Navy. Its primacy, above the waves, was known, and in holding the German battle fleet in check, and in driving the German merchant marine from the high seas, it has done precisely what was expected of it.

But France, with all possible respect, has astonished the world. She has done what she was not expected to do, and she has not done what she was confidently expected to do; and there is much good in her. She had for many years been regarded as a mercurial, emotional, excitable nation. She was expected to show much agitation in this war, and to comport herself in a spectacular manner; with much rhetoric and display. Popular panics, flamboyant "demonstrations," and perhaps revolutions, were looked for. In the field, fierce and brilliant dashes were anticipated, which might as speedily be transformed into routs. Probably nine out of ten outside observers would have predicted such courses for that country, in government, in army and in people.

In fact, the exact reverse has been realized. Of all the nations at war, France has been and is the coolest and most collected. Her nerves are steadier than those of Germany; her temperament is apparently more phlegmatic. For "bulldog tenacity," for resolution and "staying powers," she surpasses England. She has shown not a touch of panic, nor even of excitement. She has performed not one spectacular act. There is not a touch of flamboyant rhetoric in any of her utterances, in the tone of the press, or in the speeches and conversation of her citizens. The world has never seen

a finer exhibition of ordered self-restraint, of organized resolution, than France has given and is still giving.

It seems a prodigy. It is a prodigy, to those who remember only the delirious, hysterical France which was between Saarbruck and Sedan, or the excitable France of Fashoda. Yet to those who look beyond a few episodes, to the real France of extended history, this revelation of her spirit should not, after all, be surprising. For in the "Terrible Year" the soul of the country was possessed of a grim, silent resolution never surpassed in all the annals of endurance. The defence of Paris vied with Lucknow and Londonderry. There was through month after month of hopeless struggling a constancy never shaken, a resolution that never faltered. Why should we be surprised at the reappearance of the same spirit now?

Indeed, history through many centuries belies the too common notion of France as fickle and emotional. In the Hundred Years' War, she was as stubborn and as resolute and as self-contained as her English antagonist. Her patience and endurance during years of disaster were almost superhuman. Granted that in the Revolution Paris went mad and raved. There was no madness and no raving in the calm, cool, and tremendously efficient work of her soldiers upon the border, who were holding back the impact of all Europe upon her. At Waterloo the cuirassiers might dash themselves in frenzy upon the British squares or into the sunken road of Ohain; but the Guard could also stand its ground to the last with a fixedness of purpose that Wellington's "long-enduring hearts" could not exceed. In the Crimea it was the British brigade that threw itself away in that spectacular charge which "was magnificent but was not war;" while it was the French commander who gave and who amply fulfilled that unrivalled watchword of indomitable resolution, "*J'y suis, J'y reste!*"

The world is therefore astonished at France without due cause. It is not a new France that we see to-day. It is the old France of glorious history. We are surprised and astonished, not at France, but at our own misconception of France. It is not that she has transformed herself, but that we have corrected our vision and our estimate of her.